Not to further complicate an already complicated discussion, but there is
actually one more debate going on here than you or Hugh note. Hugh points
out (1) the morality of same-sex relationships. You add (2) the political
debate, which I'm sure Hugh does not disagree is an issue. He mentions the
Supreme Court case, but that actually includes two issues, only one of which
he mentions. He says the court ought not to strike down the Texas law based
on the reasoning in Bowers v. Hardwick. But Hardwick dealt with a single
issue -- how far the constitution's right to privacy went. As that case
held, the liberty protected by the constitution had been interpreted to
include privacy in certain sexual and family matters, and the majority held
that however far that right went, it did not include consensual, adult,
private homosexual sodomy. Issue one in the current case is whether that is
still good law.
However, this case involves another issue that is far more important to
lesbians and gay men -- the application of the constitution's explicit equal
protection clause -- something Bowers did not address, and Hugh surprisingly
leaves out of his discussion. The Georgia sodomy law in Bowers did not
distinguish between homosexual sodomy and heterosexual sodomy. Thus, as one
of the dissents pointed out, it was a mystery why the majority went off on
homosexuals. While the plaintiff in that case was, in fact, gay, under the
law at issue, it made no difference. It was as if the majority were to
decide, given an Asian defendant in a murder case, that they would craft a
rule for Asian murder, or Asian Miranda rights, or Asian due process.
The Texas law throws open that bizarre aspect of Hardwick. Texas permits
heterosexuals to engage in all the sodomy they want, and prohibits it only
for lesbians and gay men. This brings the equal protection clause into
play. One of the fundamental aspects of our democracy is that a majority
may not impose on a minority rules it does not impose on itself, unless
there is a good reason. While the level of scrutiny a court will give to
such laws varies, at the very least the majority must have a rational basis
for imposing rules on minorities it does not choose to impose on its own
members. Thus, the court may very well decide that, while states may
continue to prohbit sodomy despite the liberty and privacy jurisprudence,
they cannot prohibit it for one group and not for another -- a state sodomy
law must apply to all citizens or none under the equal protection clause.
While the equal protection rationale would do, I prefer the court taking the
first route and overturning Bowers v. Hardwick. If the constitution's
protection of liberty does not include protecting citizens from the
government's intrusion into the privacy in one's own bedroom, then it isn't
a very meaningful sort of liberty in one of the most central spheres of a
person's life. And that applies to heterosexuals as well as homosexuals.
One of the things that was the most disturbing to me about Senator
Santorum's remarks on sodomy was that, while the AP reporter included that
very unusual parenthetical (gay), it is not clear to me that that is what
the Senator actually said, something Andrew Sullivan has pointed out. The
transcript of the remarks is as follows:
"And if the Supreme Court says that you have the right to consensual sex
within your home, then you have the right to bigamy, you have the right to
polygamy, you have the right to incest, you have the right to adultery. You
have the right to anything."
This suggests to me, as does the rest of the transcript, that the remarks
apply to all forms of sodomy or non-procreational sex. The Senator said,
after all, that he does not believe the right to privacy exists in the
constitution at all. For some reason, whenever sodomy comes up, we
immediately think homosexual sodomy, and somehow make heterosexual sodomy invisible. That's exactly what the majority did in Bowers v. Hardwick,
never even mentioning heterosexual sodomy in a case about a law that made no
distinctions. That made the Lawrence v. Texas case necessary -- to point
out how distorted our legal discussion comes when homosexuality is involved.
I clearly disagree with Hugh as a legal matter on the privacy/libertyargument. But by leaving out the equal protection argument, he fails to say
why, if Bowers v. Hardwick is upheld, it would not -- and should not -- also
apply to him.
That equal protection argument might go further than some of its advocates want. The principle calls into question "hate crime" laws. How, if we're equally protected, can you punish someone more severely for gay bashing than random citizen bashing?